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Structure of the capital in the conditions of information asymmetry: theories of hierarchy of financing and alarm models

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UDC Code: 
Zadorozhnaya A Candidate of Economic Sciences  (anna_zador@mail.ru)

The theories of structure of capital including conditions of information asymmetry in the financial markets are considered: theories of hierarchy of sources of financing and alarm models. The analysis of results of empirical researches both on developed, and in emer-ging markets showed that any of the presented theories can't become a basis for formation of structure of the capital by the real companies. It allows to speak about need of development of more difficult concept considering not only a problem of adverse selection, but also the agency conflicts and behavioural aspects of adoption of financial decisions.

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